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ABSTRACT 
This Article examines the questions that Supreme Court Justices ask during oral 
argument. The authors content-coded questions asked in fifty-three cases argued during 
the October 2009, 2010, and 2011 terms—a total of 5,115 questions. They found that the 
Justices vary significantly in the extent to which they ask about different aspects of a 
case, including threshold issues, precedent, facts, external actors, legal argument, and 
policy. They also found that the Justices were more likely to ask policy-oriented 
questions in education cases than in constitutional cases that did not arise in a school 
setting. The authors included a case study of Camreta v. Greene to illustrate with specific 
examples each current Justice's questioning style. The Study concludes that oral 
argument plays an important role in the Supreme Court's decision-making process, 
giving the Justices the opportunity to ask questions that are of concern to them.  
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 “Well, the same, it seems to me, would be true, say, for the market in 
emergency services: police, fire, ambulance, roadside assistance, 
whatever. You don’t know when you’re going to need it; you’re not sure 
that you will. But the same is true for health care. . . . So, can the 
government require you to buy a cell phone because that would facilitate 
responding when you need emergency services? You can just dial 911 no 
matter where you are?” – Chief Justice John G. Roberts 1 
“Could you define the market—everybody has to buy food sooner or later. 
So, you define the market as food; therefore, everybody’s in the market; 
therefore, you can make people buy broccoli.” – Justice Antonin Scalia 2  
“Assume for the moment that this is unprecedented. This is a step beyond 
what our cases have allowed, the affirmative duty to act to go into 
commerce. If that is so, do you not have a heavy burden of justification? I 
understand that we must presume laws are constitutional, but, even so, 
when you are changing the relation of the individual to the government in 
this, what we can stipulate is, I think, a unique way, do you not have a 
heavy burden of justification to show authorization under the 
Constitution?” – Justice Anthony Kennedy 3 
“Before you move on, could you express your limiting principle as 
succinctly as you possibly can?” – Justice Samuel Alito 4  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Justices of the United States Supreme Court asked the foregoing questions 
during oral argument on March 27, 2012, in National Federation of Independent Business 
v. Sebelius.5 The issue before the Court that day was whether the individual mandate 
provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act6—more commonly known as 
                                                 
1 Transcript of Oral Argument at 5-6, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012), 
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-398-Tuesday.pdf. 
March 27, 2012, was the second day of three days of oral argument on the three cases—National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius; Dep’t of Health and Human Services v. Florida; and 
Florida v. Dep’t of Health and Human Services—the Supreme Court consolidated together to rule on 
challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. 
2 Id. at 13. 
3 Id. at 11-12. 
4 Id. at 44. 
5 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
6 Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). Although the majority of the ACA has been codified under 
Title 42 of the U.S. Code, Chapter 157, Quality Affordable Health Care for All Americans, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
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the ACA—was within Congress’s regulatory powers. As these questions illustrate, oral 
argument before the Supreme Court provides an opportunity for the Justices to probe any 
aspect of the case they wish to examine. Justices often express different concerns through 
their questioning. As University of Minnesota professor and Supreme Court observer 
Timothy Johnson has noted, oral argument affords the Justices a chance to mine for 
information on their own terms.7 During oral argument, attorneys must answer whatever 
questions the Justices throw at them—there is no place to hide. This process contrasts 
starkly with the litigants’ written briefs, wherein attorneys emphasize (and exclude) what 
they choose. 8  Oral argument thereby provides a unique window into the Justices’ 
analytical styles.  
Against that background, this Article argues that the Justices’ questions reflect their 
thinking, and that the Justices use oral argument to ask questions about topics that 
concern them. Viewing oral argument as revelatory of the Justices’ mindsets spurs many 
questions: If the Justices can ask about any feature of the case before them, what types of 
questions do they ask? Are certain types of information more important to one Justice 
than to another? Given that the Justices have their own personal policy preferences and 
political leanings, to what extent do they ask about the implications of their decisions or 
broader policy concerns?  
This Study attempts to answer those questions. Part II of this Article presents an 
overview of previous research that focused on questions asked during oral argument, 
including research conducted by Professor Johnson. Inspired by Professor Johnson’s 
research, Part III of this Article provides an expanded quantitative content analysis of oral 
argument transcripts to identify the types of questions asked by each Justice in fifty-three 
recent cases.9 Part IV examines resulting data to provide a greater understanding of both 
the purpose of oral argument and the approach to questioning taken by individual 
Justices. The data illustrate how Justices vary in the types of questions they ask and the 
extent to which they each focus on policy issues during oral argument. Part V includes an 
in-depth analysis of a recent case, Camreta v. Greene.10 This qualitative analysis includes 
specific examples of the types of questions most commonly asked by the current Justices. 
Taken together, information from quantitative and qualitative data provide insight into 
each Justice’s approach to oral argument and allow for a more nuanced understanding of 
the oral argument process. 
II. PREVIOUS RESEARCH ON QUESTIONS ASKED DURING ORAL ARGUMENT 
Justices and scholars alike disagree about the importance and function of oral 
argument. Justice Clarence Thomas claimed that Justices almost always have their minds 
                                                                                                                                                 
18001-18121 (2012), the individual mandate provision appears in the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 
5000A (2012). 
7 TIMOTHY R. JOHNSON, ORAL ARGUMENTS AND DECISION MAKING ON THE UNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT 13 (Robert J. Spitzer ed., 2004). 
8 See id. at 12. 
9 Beginning with the October 2006 term, the Court has made the transcripts of oral arguments available to 
the public on its website, www.supremecourt.gov, on the same day an argument is heard by the Court. See 
infra Part III.A for a description of how these cases were selected. 
10 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011). 
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made up before hearing oral argument,11 which indicates a limited role for oral argument 
in the Court’s decision-making process. To that end, Justice Samuel Alito, too, has 
described oral argument as being unimportant. 12  In contrast, Professor Lawrence 
Wrightsman argued that oral arguments are influential because they allow the Justices to 
explore the application of arguments set out in written briefs, and also provide a forum in 
which the Justices can communicate with and attempt to sway their colleagues.13 Former 
Justice Harry Blackmun agreed that oral argument is important, explaining, “A good 
oralist can add a lot to a case and help us in our later analysis of what the case is all 
about. Many times confusion [in the brief] is clarified by what the lawyers have to say.”14 
In light of that disagreement, this Article examines questions asked at oral 
argument as a means to explore how Justices use that forum. Professor Timothy 
Johnson’s work underscoring the role of oral argument as an information-gathering tool15 
served as the starting point for this Study. Johnson postulated that oral argument provides 
a unique opportunity for the Justices to gather information; briefs submitted by the parties 
by definition present a one-sided view of the case.16 To examine the types of questions 
asked during oral argument, Johnson developed a coding scheme of six distinct 
categories to classify arguments set forth in written briefs and questions asked at oral 
argument. 17 He applied that scheme to a random sample of seventy-five cases heard 
between 1972 and 1986.18 Johnson’s scheme included the following content categories: 
Policy; External Actors; Precedent; Threshold Issues; Legal Arguments; and Facts. 19 
Johnson concluded that oral arguments are an important method by which the Justices 
collect information relevant to policy issues.20 The quantity of Policy questions (42%) 
was significantly greater than the number of questions asked about constitutional issues 
(Legal Arguments) (10%), Precedent (9%), or Threshold Issues (4%).21  
                                                 
11 See LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, ORAL ARGUMENTS BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT: AN EMPIRICAL 
APPROACH 25 (Ronald Roesch, ed., 2008). 
12 Deb Peterson, Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito Speaks at St. Louis Law Day, STL TODAY, May 16, 
2011, http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/columns/deb-peterson/article_873af5a6-8008-11e0-8324- 
001a4bcf6878.html. 
13 WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 11, at ix. See also James C. Phillips & Edward L. Carter, Oral Argument in the 
Early Roberts Court: A Qualitative and Quantitative Analysis of Individual Justice Behavior, 11 J. APP. 
PRAC. & PROCESS 325, 329 (2010). 
14 Philippa Strumm, Change and Continuity on the Supreme Court: Conversations with Justice Harry 
Blackmun, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 285, 298-304 (2000). Similarly, Justice Ginsburg commented, “I have seen 
few victories snatched at oral argument from a total defeat the judges had anticipated on the basis of the 
briefs. But I have seen several potential winners become losers in whole or in part because of clarification 
elicited at argument. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks on Appellate Advocacy, 50 S.C. L. REV. 567, 570 
(1999). 
15 See JOHNSON, supra note 7, at 21-56. 
16 Id. at 23-24. 
17 Id. at 32-35. 
18 Id. at 28-29. 
19 Id. at 34-35. Johnson defined “Policy” as “questions about legal principles the Court should adopt, 
courses of action the Court should take, or a Justice’s beliefs about the content of public policy.” Id. at 34. 
“External Actors” referred to non-parties’ preferences about the outcome of a case, hypothetical questions, 
and the potential implications of a decision. Id. “Precedent” referred to previous Court decisions; 
“Threshold Issues” included matters such as jurisdiction; “Legal Arguments” included constitutional 
provisions; and “Facts” were questions about the facts of what occurred in the case. Id. at 34-35. 
20 Id. at 55-56. 
21 Id. at 53. 
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Apart from Johnson’s study, there has been limited empirical research on the 
content of oral argument.22 One study focused on the role of laughter at the Court.23 
Another analyzed the type of language the Justices use at oral argument.24 Johnson also 
examined whether the quality of a lawyer’s oral argument affected the final judgment on 
the merits, finding that it did.25 Professors James Phillips and Edward Carter examined 
how talkative the Justices were during oral argument, and found that the more the 
Justices spoke to one party, the less likely they were to vote for that side.26 These general 
empirical studies of oral argument have not specifically addressed the content of 
questions asked at oral argument. Thus, this Study aims to analyze the content of those 
questions in order to discern the information Justices seek at oral argument.  
III. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY FOCUSED ON POLICY QUESTIONS: METHODOLOGY 
This Study expands upon Professor Johnson’s research. Johnson was able to 
analyze only aggregate data about the Court. Since 2004, however, the official transcripts 
of oral arguments have identified the Justices by name, facilitating examination of each 
Justice individually, as well as the Court collectively. This Study examines the types of 
questions asked by each Justice and also focuses on whether the Justices differed in the 
extent to which they asked questions about policy.  
 
A. Sample Set 
The Sample consisted of fifty-three cases argued during the October 2008, 2009, 
and 2010 terms.27  The cases shared the following criteria: (1) nine Justices were present 
for the oral argument; (2) the Court reached a decision in the case (i.e., did not set for re-
argument or dismiss as improvidently granted); and (3) each case either raised a 
                                                 
22 See, e.g., James C. Phillips & Edward L. Carter, Gender and U.S. Supreme Court Oral Argument on the 
Roberts Court: An Empirical Examination, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 613 (2010) (assessing questions on an 
information-seeking continuum, and focusing on gender influence on the court); Lee Epstein, William M. 
Landes, & Richard A. Posner, Inferring the Winning Party in the Supreme Court from the Pattern of 
Questioning at Oral Argument, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 433 (2010) (finding a correlation between the number of 
questions and number of words per question asked of a party at oral argument and the likelihood that the 
party will lose the case). 
23 See Ryan A. Malphurs, “People Did Sometimes Stick Things in my Underwear” The Function of 
Laughter at the U.S. Supreme Court, 10 COMM. L. REV. 48, 48-75 (2011). See also Adam Liptak, A 
Taxonomy of Supreme Court Humor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/25/ 
us/25bar.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=funniest%20supreme%20court%20Justice&st=cse.  
24 See Sarah A. Treul, Ryan C. Black & Timothy R. Johnson, Jekyll and Hyde Questions from the Bench: 
Does the Emotional Nature of Supreme Court Justices’ Questions Affect Their Votes on the Merits? 1-28 
(May 20, 2009) (unpublished working paper) (previous version of paper was presented at the 2009 
meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association in Chicago, Illinois), available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1407518. 
25 See Timothy R. Johnson, Paul J. Wahlbeck & James F. Spriggs, II, The Influence of Oral Arguments on 
the U.S. Supreme Court, 100 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 99, 99-113 (2006). 
26 Phillips & Carter, supra note 13, at 388. See also id. at 329-30 (noting other studies that have found the 
same correlation). In their study, Phillips and Carter categorized questions as “genuine,” “counterfeit or 
pseudo-questions,” and “non-questions.” Id. at 331. 
27 A complete list of cases by term is found infra Appendix A. 
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constitutional issue, was an education case, or both.28 The sample included a total of nine 
education cases, six of which addressed constitutional issues and three of which 
addressed statutory questions.29  
Although the majority of cases the Court decides each year do not involve a 
constitutional issue,30 this Study used cases raising constitutional issues for two reasons. 
First, although the Court explores the policy implications of every case, cases requiring 
constitutional interpretation allow the Court to map out the law in the first instance. Thus, 
constitutional cases are particularly ripe for discussion of the policy implications of the 
Court’s decision. In contrast, in cases demanding statutory interpretation, the Court’s task 
is to apply the policy that the legislature has already developed. As Supreme Court 
journalist Dahlia Lithwick noted, “In many, many ways, this is a policy-setting 
institution. They’re not simply common law judges who decide the case in front of 
them.”31 Second, the cases answering constitutional questions are often the cases that 
raise the most controversial social issues with the farthest-reaching policy implications. 
Education cases were included in this study as an example of a type of case that often 
implicates important policy issues that affect a majority of the country. School officials 
must make complex judgments about issues such as search and seizure, free speech, and 
religious activities at school, and they often make the argument that the Justices should 
defer to their (the school officials’) judgments in making school policies.32 Given this 
recurring policy argument, the authors wondered whether the Justices would be more or 
less likely to ask policy questions in this category of cases as compared to constitutional 
cases. 
                                                 
28 “Education case” was defined as either arising from a dispute in a school setting or concerning an 
educational issue. 
29 The education cases were the following:  
2008 Term 
• Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353 (2009) (First Amendment issue). 
• Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009) (Title IX issue in K-12 school setting). 
• Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009) (funding for English Language Learner programs under Equal 
Educational Opportunities Act). 
• Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009) (Fourth Amendment issue). 
• Forest Grove v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230 (2009) (issue under the Individuals with Disabilities Education 
Act). 
2009 Term 
• Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 
(2010) (First Amendment issue). 
2010 Term 
• J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (application of Miranda rights in school setting). 
• Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011) (Establishment Clause issue). 
• Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011) (Fourth Amendment issue). 
30 In 2007, for example, Baum reports that 73% of the cases had no constitutional issue decided. 
LAWRENCE BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 157 (10th ed. 2010). 
31Digital recording: Bob Edwards Weekend, Sirius XM Satellite Radio (May 29, 2010) (on file with 
author). 
32 See, e.g., Brief for National School Boards Association and American Association of School 
Administrators as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 18-19, Safford, 557 U.S. 364 (No. 08-479), 2009 
WL 641332, at *18-19.  
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B. Expanding the Policy Question Category 
In this Study, every question asked during oral argument was coded using a 
modified version of Johnson’s categories. 33  This Study also looked more closely at 
different types of policy questions, whereas Johnson employed one general Policy 
category. To provide additional insight into the Justices’ concerns, this Study divided the 
Policy category into four sub-categories. When a Justice asked a hypothetical question or 
a question about an extension or application of the decision, the question was considered 
a policy question and was labeled Policy A. Johnson included these questions in his 
“External Actors” category, but not every such question actually referred to the impact on 
or preference of external actors; in this Study, only questions that directly asked about 
such an impact were coded as “External Actors.”  
This Study further divided Johnson’s Policy category into three other parts: 
questions about legal principles that the Court should adopt were coded Policy B; 
questions about courses of action that the Court should take were coded Policy C; and 
questions that revealed a Justice’s beliefs about the content of public policy were coded 
Policy D. Finally, in this Study, questions were not double coded into two separate 
categories (as they were in Johnson’s study). 




Questions that ask about whether the Court should 
hear the case (e.g., whether the case is moot) 
“It takes two to tango, and a case or controversy 
requires somebody on the other side who cares a fig 
about the outcome. And here, S.G., . . . the young 
woman affected in the case, has moved to another 
state . . . making it virtually certain that she’ll never 
confront this situation again.”34 
Precedent 
Questions that ask specifically about a prior case 
 
“But in Flast—I’ve looked at it again briefly, and it 
seemed to use that wonderfully precise word 
‘nexus.’”35 
Facts 
Questions about what happened leading to the case 
being argued 
“Was there prior experience in this particular 
school? Were there prior occasions on which 
students had been strip-searched and contraband 
found?”36 
                                                 
33 A copy of the coding guidelines is included infra Appendix B. Three independent coders coded each 
question. If there was any disagreement among the three coders, a fourth coder made the final decision 
about the appropriate category for that question. 
34 Transcript of Oral Argument at 6-7, Camreta, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (No. 09-1454) [hereinafter Camreta Oral 
Argument]. 
35 Transcript of Oral Argument at 55-56, Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org., 131 S. Ct. 1436 (No. 09-987). 
36 Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Safford, 557 U.S. 364 (No. 08-479). 
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY     [2012 
  96 
 
External Actors 
Questions about how a decision in the case being 
argued affects outside parties, such as school 
officials or Congress 
“Okay. But I think we’ve got to assume that 
Congress had some concern for the parents who 
correctly say, this IEP is no good, it just can’t be 
done in the school system and the kid needs a 
special school. In that case . . . your answer may be 
that’s the exceptional case and it shouldn’t drive 
[the] inferences to be drawn about congressional 
intent. But in that case, if the district and the parents 
are at good faith loggerheads, it can go on for a 
long, long time, can’t it?”37  
Legal Argument 
Questions about petitioner/respondent’s argument in 
the case before the Court 
“In other words, you agree with Justice Kagan’s 
criticism of those cases, and you said, yes, she’s 
right; those cases were wrongly decided.”38 
Policy A 
Hypothetical questions or questions about extension 
or application of the decision 
 
“But . . . if we hold in your favor in this case and the 
next school district says, all right, we’re going to 
have classes in body cavity searches, then there 
would be no legal basis, if we accept your principle, 
for saying that’s out of bounds as a matter of the 
Fourth Amendment, isn’t that correct?”39 
Policy B 
Questions about legal principles that the Court 
should adopt 
“And there are differences. Some 15-year-olds 
know a lot more than some 17-year-olds, and so on. 
And . . . the facts that you’re concerned about all go 
into the voluntariness inquiry, which is still 
pertinent after Miranda. Why don’t we just put 
those facts into that inquiry and say, look, we’ve got 
one strict rule; everybody knows it, you hear it on 
TV all the time, people are given Miranda 
warnings; that part of it is done?”40 
Policy C 
Questions about the course of action the Court 
should take 
“There certainly, I would think, would be a problem 
if the right-to-work people can get there. And you 
are not going to let the unions get there. But I don’t 
know the facts. So shouldn’t we just send this case 
back and say: Please look at what the situation 
is?”41  
Policy D 
Questions that reveal a Justice’s beliefs about the 
content of public policy 
“We don’t want Miranda warnings to be given 
where they are unnecessary because they are only 
necessary to prevent coercion, and where there’s no 
coercion, we want confessions, don’t we? And the 
Miranda warnings deter confessions.”42 
                                                 
37 Transcript of Oral Argument at 11-12, Forest Grove, 557 U.S. 230 (No. 08-305) (finding that under the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), Forest Grove School District was required to 
reimburse T.A. for private special education services, in spite of the fact that T.A. had not previously 
received special education services at the public school, because the public school failed to provide free 
appropriate public education (FAPE) and the private school placement was appropriate).  
38 Transcript of Oral Argument at 12, Ariz. Christian, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (No. 09-987). 
39 Transcript of Oral Argument at 18, Safford, 557 U.S. 364 (No. 08-479). 
40 Id. at 14. 
41 Transcript of Oral Argument at 10-11, Ysursa, 555 U.S. 353 (No. 07-869) (finding for the state in a First 
Amendment challenge to an Idaho state law banning public employee payroll deductions for political 
activities).  
42 Transcript of Oral Argument at 51-52, J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. 2394 (09-11121). 




A. Frequency Data 
The fifty-three cases included a total of 5115 questions. Questions asked in 
education cases (1084) constituted 21.2% of the total, while questions asked in non-
education cases (4031) constituted 78.8%. The data regarding individual Justices set out 
below include statistics for retired Justices Stevens and Souter. The remainder of this 







(% of total in 
Sample)43 
Number of Cases in which 
Justice participated 
Average Number of 
Questions Per Case 
Antonin Scalia 1003 (19.6%) 53 18.9 
John G. Roberts 798 (15.6%) 53 15.1 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg 634 (12.4%) 53 12.0 
Stephen Breyer 627 (12.3%) 53 11.8 
Anthony Kennedy 520 (10.2%) 53 9.8 
Samuel Alito 409 (8.0%) 53 7.7 
John Paul Stevens 345 (6.7%) 40 8.6 
Sonia Sotomayor 322 (6.3%) 29 11.1 
David Souter 342 (6.7%) 24 14.25 
Elena Kagan 115 (2.2%) 13 8.8 
Clarence Thomas 0 53 0.0 
 
These findings are consistent with previous research that found Justice Antonin 
Scalia to be a very active questioner,44 and the widely reported fact that Justice Clarence 
Thomas has not asked a question during oral argument since February 22, 2006.45 
                                                 
43 All percentages from this Study have been rounded to the nearest tenth of one percent. 
44 See Phillips & Carter, supra note 13, at 353-54; Joan Biskupic, Roberts, Scalia Strike Similar Chords on 
Court, USA TODAY, Apr. 10, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-04-09-roberts-
scalia_N.htm; SCOTUSBLOG, STAT PACK FOR OCTOBER TERM 2010 FINAL 15 (2011), available at 
http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/06/SB_OT10_stat_pack_final.pdf [hereinafter 
SCOTUSBLOG STAT PACK OT2010]. SCOTUSblog reports the following average number of questions per 
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B. Justices’ Concern with Policy 
Consistent with Johnson’s findings,46 36.1% of the Justices’ questions in this Study 
were about Policy. Of the 5115 total questions, 1848 questions concerned Policy, while 
the remaining 3267 questions fell under the other five content categories. Additionally, 
Justices varied in their focus on Policy. As a percentage of the Justice’s total number of 
questions asked, Justice Alito asked the highest number of Policy questions of any 
current Justice (46.4% of his questions concerned Policy). Justice Ginsburg asked the 
lowest number of Policy questions (20% of her questions). 47  This difference is 
statistically significant.48 Data regarding all of the current Justices’ Policy questions are 
set out below: 
Table 2 
 
Justice Percentage of Justice’s Questions That Concerned Policy 
Samuel Alito 46.4% 
Stephen Breyer 42.8% 
Anthony Kennedy 41.6% 
Elena Kagan 36.6% 
John G. Roberts 35.9% 
Antonin Scalia 34.3% 
Sonia Sotomayor 27.0% 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg 20.0% 
Clarence Thomas 0.0% 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Kagan: 10.6 
Thomas: 0  
Id. These data also show that this bench is extremely “hot,” with the Justices actively engaged in 
questioning and with Justice Sotomayor especially becoming a more active questioner over the past two 
terms. SCOTUSblog’s Stat Pack for the October 2011 Term lists Justice Sotomayor as the second most 
active questioner in terms of average number of questions per case, behind only Justice Scalia. 
SCOTUSBLOG, STAT PACK FOR OCTOBER TERM 2011 FINAL 18 (2012), available at 
http://dailywrit.com/blog/uploads/2012/06/SCOTUSblog_Stat_Pack_OT11_final.pdf. According to 
SCOTUSblog, she asked an average of 21.3 questions per case in OT 2011, id., and 19.2 questions per case 
in OT 2010. In our Sample, in contrast, Justice Sotomayor asked an average of 11.1 questions per case. See 
supra Table 1. 
45 See, e.g., Adam Liptak, No Argument: Thomas Keeps 5-Year Silence, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/13/us/13thomas.html. 
46 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
47 Excluding Justice Thomas, who did not ask any questions in the entirety of this sample. 
48 c2(9, N=5115)=117.22, p = .00. Statistical significance levels indicate how likely it is that a reported 
result is due to chance. Here, with a significance level (p) of less than .01, there is a greater than 99% 
probability that the results are true and not the result of chance. 
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C. Individual Justices’ Concerns49 
1. Chief Justice John G. Roberts 
Content 




External Actors 0.5% 
Legal 55.5% 
Policy (Total) 35.9% 
          Policy A (hypothetical) 20.2% 
          Policy B (legal principle) 4.3% 
          Policy C (action) 3.1% 
          Policy D (belief) 8.3% 
 
The Chief Justice was the second most active questioner in this Study, positing 15.6% of 
the total questions.50 Like his colleagues, the Chief Justice was more likely to ask about 
Legal Arguments than about any other topic. When questioning about Policy, the Chief 
Justice most often focused on hypothetical applications of the case at hand (Policy A); 
20.2% of his questions fell into that sub-category. He asked more Policy A questions than 
any of the Associate Justices.51 
2. Justice Antonin Scalia 
Content 




External Actors 0.4% 
Legal 56.6% 
Policy (Total) 34.3% 
           Policy A (hypothetical) 14.8% 
           Policy B (legal principle) 3.1% 
           Policy C (action) 3.3% 
           Policy D (belief) 13.1% 
 
Justice Scalia was the most active questioner at oral arguments in the Sample, posing 
19.6% of the total questions asked.52 He asked far more questions about advocates’ Legal 
Arguments than any other type of question. Among his colleagues, Justice Scalia was the 
Justice most likely to ask a Policy D question, contributing 27.8% of the Court’s total 
                                                 
49 Justices listed in order of seniority. 
50 See supra Table 1. 
51 See supra Appendix C, Table 6. 
52 See supra Table 1. 
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questions that reveal the questioner’s views about public policy issues (amounting to just 
over 13% of his own questions).53 As the longest-serving Justice currently on the Court, 
Justice Scalia is well known for his aggressive and active style on the bench. 54 His 
willingness to reveal his policy opinions through his questions may be a function of his 
years of experience as a member of the Court as well as of his personality. 
3. Justice Anthony Kennedy 
Content 




External Actors 0.8% 
Legal 51.9% 
Policy (Total) 41.6% 
           Policy A (hypothetical) 18.7% 
           Policy B (legal principle) 6.0% 
           Policy C (action) 3.8% 
           Policy D (belief) 13.1% 
 
Compared to the other Justices, Justice Kennedy asked the second highest percentage of 
Policy D questions (after Justice Scalia), those expressing his own views about Policy.55 
He was most interested in asking questions about the Legal Argument, then asking 
hypothetical questions (Policy A), but also concerned about Precedent (he ranked third 
among all Justices in that category).56  Justice Kennedy is often described as the swing 
vote on the Court,57 and interestingly, these data show Justice Kennedy in the middle of 
the Justices on almost every measure, both in terms of frequency of questions and in 
percentage of questions asked. Justice Kennedy ranked fifth in the frequency of 
questions, and fifth in asking about each of these topics: Facts, Legal Arguments, 
hypothetical questions (Policy A), and legal principles that the Court should adopt 
(Policy B). 58 This indicates that Justice Kennedy may be using oral argument as an 
opportunity to assess his colleagues’ positions, listening more than questioning, but still 
willing to reveal his policy preferences on occasion. 
                                                 
53 See infra Appendix C, Table 9. 
54 See, e.g., JEFFREY ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT 199-200 (2006) (describing Justice Scalia’s “tendency to 
dominate oral argument with aggressive questions and showy put-downs”).  
55 See infra Appendix C, Table 9. 
56 See infra Appendix C, Table 2. 
57 See, e.g., Massimo Calabrese & David Von Drehle, What Will Justice Kennedy Do?, TIME, June 18, 
2012, at 28, 31; Phillips & Carter, supra note 13, at 361-62; ROSEN, supra note 54, at 235; SCOTUSBLOG 
STAT PACK OT2010, supra note 44, at 10, 12 (reporting Justice Kennedy in the majority in 94% of cases 
and 88% of the time in cases decided by a five-to-four vote). 
58 See infra Appendix C, Table 3 (Facts), Table 5 (Legal Arguments), Table 6 (Policy A) & Table 7 (Policy 
B). 
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4. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
Content 




External Actors 0.6% 
Legal 60.7% 
Policy (Total) 20.0% 
           Policy A (hypothetical) 11.7% 
           Policy B (legal principle) 3.2% 
           Policy C (action) 2.1% 
           Policy D (belief) 3.0% 
 
Justice Ginsburg is unusual in that she asked more questions than any other Justice in 
three different question categories: Threshold, Precedent, and Facts. 59  In the Policy 
category, however, she asked the lowest percentage of questions of all her colleagues (not 
including Justice Thomas).60  
As shown in the table above, the majority of Justice Ginsburg’s questions 
concerned Legal Arguments. Her second most prevalent area of interest was clarifying 
the Facts in each particular case. Justice Ginsburg seems to approach questioning during 
oral argument in a traditional, lawyer-like fashion: she is most likely to ask about the 
predicate issues and then probe for additional facts. She will challenge the lawyers to 
clarify and justify their legal arguments but is less likely to examine the policy 
implications of the case. 
5. Justice Stephen Breyer 
Content 




External Actors 0.3% 
Legal 50.1% 
Policy (Total) 42.8% 
           Policy A (hypothetical) 22.3% 
           Policy B (legal principle) 6.2% 
           Policy C (action) 4.6% 
           Policy D (belief) 9.7% 
 
Justice Breyer was most concerned with questions regarding Legal Arguments, 
dedicating half of his questions to that topic. He was the second most likely Justice to ask 
                                                 
59 See infra Appendix C, Table 1 (Threshold), Table 2 (Precedent), & Table 3 (Facts). 
60 See supra Table 2. 
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about Policy, asking 42.8% of the Court’s total Policy questions in the Sample.61 When 
doing so, Justice Breyer focused first on Policy A questions (hypothetical situations and 
the application of the Court’s decision to future cases). Of all the Justices, he asked the 
most Policy B questions, probing for answers about legal principles that the Court should 
adopt.62  Justice Breyer seems to use oral argument as an opportunity to work through 
both the legal arguments and policy issues of a case, asking the attorneys to help him 
clarify his ideas while also examining the many policy implications of a decision. 
6. Justice Samuel Alito 
Content 




External Actors 0.0% 
Legal 49.6% 
Policy (Total) 46.4% 
           Policy A (hypothetical) 33.5% 
           Policy B (legal principle) 4.9% 
           Policy C (action) 2.4% 
           Policy D (belief) 5.6% 
 
With the exception of Justice Thomas, Justice Alito was the least active questioner during 
oral argument.63 When he did ask a question, however, he was most likely to focus on 
Legal Arguments. Justice Alito was the Justice most concerned with Policy.64 The data 
show that about one-third of Justice Alito’s questions posited a hypothetical or inquired 
about the extension or application of the Court’s decision (Policy A). Justice Alito, 
though, was not likely to explore the other policy implications of a case (e.g., only 4.9% 
of his questions focused on principles that the Court should adopt (Policy B) and only 
2.4% explored courses of action that the court should take (Policy C)). He was very 
unlikely to ask a Threshold question or a question about Precedent. 
                                                 
61 See id. 
62 See infra Appendix C, Table 7. 
63 See supra Table 1. 
64 See supra Table 2. 
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7. Justice Sonia Sotomayor 
Content 




External Actors 0.3% 
Legal 69.6% 
Policy (Total) 27.0% 
           Policy A (hypothetical) 14.6% 
           Policy B (legal principle) 4.7% 
           Policy C (action) 3.7% 
           Policy D (belief) 4.0% 
 
Compared with the other Justices, Justice Sotomayor was unlikely to ask any questions 
about Facts or External Actors, or to express her own view on Policy (Policy D).65 The 
vast majority of her questions concerned Legal Arguments. 
 Justice Sotomayor participated in only twenty-nine of the fifty-three cases in 
this Sample, reflecting her role as the second most junior Justice. Only Justice Kagan 
asked a smaller percentage of Policy D questions (expressing her own views), a finding 
that is unsurprising given the fact that these two Justices have the least experience on the 
Court. 
8. Justice Elena Kagan 
Content 




External Actors 0.0% 
Legal 61.7% 
Policy (Total) 36.6% 
           Policy A (hypothetical) 23.5% 
           Policy B (legal principle) 9.6% 
           Policy C (action) 0.0% 
           Policy D (belief) 3.5% 
 
Legal questions were Justice Kagan’s primary focus, constituting over 60% of her total 
questions. Almost none of her questions concerned Threshold, Precedent, Facts, or 
External Actors (which together equaled only 1.8% of her total). When she did ask 
questions about Policy, Justice Kagan concentrated on exploring how the decision might 
be extended (Policy A). It is important to note that Justice Kagan participated in just 
thirteen cases in this Sample, so these results have less reliability than those of her more 
                                                 
65 See infra Appendix C, Table 3 (Facts), Table 4 (External Actors), & Table 9 (Policy D). 
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experienced colleagues. It is too early in her tenure on the Court to know whether Justice 
Kagan’s questioning style will remain in this pattern or will evolve as she gains more 
experience on the bench. 
 
D. Policy Questions in Education Cases 
The Justices in this Study, as demonstrated by the data, ask more Policy questions 
in education cases than in non-education constitutional cases. This difference is 
statistically significant.66 Further research must be conducted to determine if this pattern 
holds for other predictably policy-heavy types of cases (e.g., criminal cases, immigration 
proceedings, or redistricting laws) but it does show that the Justices are especially 
focused on the policy implications of their decisions in cases involving public schools. 
The Court clearly does not automatically defer to the judgment of school administrators. 
In fact, in the three K-12 education cases in the Sample in which a school district was a 
party, the Court ruled against the district in each case.67 
 
Table 3: Policy Questions in Education Cases 
 
Type of Case Number of Questions Percentage of Questions Concerned with Policy 
Education 1084 41.1% 
Non-Education 4031 34.8% 
V. CASE STUDY: QUESTIONS DURING ORAL ARGUMENT IN CAMRETA V. GREENE68 
Taken together, the data from this Study illustrate what happens at oral argument. 
The data show that the Justices each ask different types of questions, that they focus on 
policy questions to different degrees, and that collectively they ask more questions about 
policy in education cases than in non-education constitutional cases. How, though, do 
these differences translate into describing the Justices’ individual behavior during oral 
argument? A qualitative analysis of Camreta v. Greene, 69  a recent education case, 
provides a detailed and concrete example of how the Justices actually use oral argument 
to gather information and communicate their concerns with the parties and their 
colleagues. This case study also shows how these different approaches allow the Justices 
to collectively clarify facts, examine the legal issues at hand, and explore the implications 
of a given decision for public policy. 
                                                 
66 c2(1, N=5115)=14.44, p = .00. 
67 The nine education cases can be grouped as follows: (a) Cases in which a K-12 school district was a 
party (three cases: Fitzgerald, 555 U.S. at 246; Safford, 557 U.S. at 364; and Forest Grove, 557 U.S. at 
230); (b) Cases involving an institution of higher education (one case: Christian Legal Soc’y, 130 S. Ct. at 
2971); (c) Cases that involved an education issue but in which a school district was not a party (five cases: 
Ysursa, 555 U.S. at 353; Horne, 557 U.S. at 433; Arizona Christian, 131 S. Ct. at 1436; J.D.B., 131 S. Ct. 
at 2394; and Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2020). 
68 131 S. Ct. 2020 (2011).  
69 Id. 
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A. Background on Camreta v. Greene 
Camreta v. Greene (with Alford v. Greene) was argued on March 1, 2011. The case 
involved allegations that a man, Nimrod Greene, sexually abused his young daughter, 
referred to as S.G. 70  Petitioners Bob Camreta, an investigator with the Oregon 
Department of Human Services, and Deputy Sheriff James Alford went to 9-year-old 
S.G.’s elementary school to interview her about the allegations of abuse.71 When they 
arrived at the school, a guidance counselor took S.G. out of class, explaining that some 
people needed to talk to her, and left S.G. with Camreta and Alford for a period of up to 
two hours.72 
S.G.’s mother, Sarah Greene, filed a Section 198373 lawsuit alleging that petitioners 
Camreta and Alford violated S.G.’s Fourth Amendment rights when they seized and 
interviewed her without a warrant and without her mother’s consent or presence.74 A 
federal district court granted summary judgment to the petitioners.75 On appeal, the Ninth 
Circuit held that S.G.’s Fourth Amendment rights were violated when she was seized and 
interrogated in the absence of a warrant, a court order, exigent circumstances, or probable 
cause.76 The Ninth Circuit also held, however, that the law concerning in-school seizures 
was not “clearly established,” and thus held that the petitioners were entitled to the 
protection of qualified immunity.77 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address two questions: (1) whether the 
Ninth Circuit’s ruling was reviewable given that the petitioners had prevailed on grounds 
of qualified immunity; and (2) whether the Ninth Circuit correctly determined that the 
interview violated S.G.’s Fourth Amendment rights.78 
Although the school district was not a party to this case, the case as a whole raised 
significant policy issues for schools in general. The National School Boards Association 
(NSBA) filed an amicus brief addressing its concerns.79 First, the NSBA argued that the 
concept of a “seizure” under Fourth Amendment law had developed in the law 
enforcement context and should not apply in the school setting, where children already 
lack the right to come and go at will.80 Second, it urged that requiring school personnel to 
be the gatekeepers in such situations would put them in the untenable position of having 
                                                 
70 Id. at 2027. 
71 Id. 
72 Greene v. Camreta, 588 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 2009). The parties disagreed about the length of time 
and the interview was not recorded. Id. 
73 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012). 
74 Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2027. 
75 Id. 
76 Greene, 588 F.3d at 1030. 
77 Id. at 1031-33. 
78 Camreta, 131 S. Ct. at 2026. The case was decided on May 26, 2011. Id. at 2020. Justice Kagan 
delivered the opinion for the seven-member majority, with Justices Kennedy and Thomas dissenting. Id. 
The Court ruled only on the first question posed. Id. at 2026. Justice Kagan wrote, “We conclude that this 
Court generally may review a lower court’s constitutional ruling at the behest of a government official 
granted immunity. But we may not do so in this case for reasons peculiar to it.” Id. According to the Court, 
the case was moot because the child involved (S.G.) grew up and moved away from Oregon; therefore, it 
could not reach the merits of the Fourth Amendment question. Id. 
79 See Brief for National School Boards Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2, 
Camreta, 131 S. Ct. 2020 (Nos. 09-1454, 09-1478), 2010 WL 5168881, at *2. 
80 Id. at 5-8. 
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to evaluate whether law enforcement officials and caseworkers had the legal justification 
to question students.81 School personnel, the NSBA argued, do not have the training to 
make such judgments and even if training could be provided, doing so might place them 
in direct conflict with the law in every state that requires them to report evidence of 
sexual abuse.82 
B. Questions During Oral Argument 
With the exception of Justice Thomas, every current Justice asked questions during 
the oral argument (reaching a cumulative total of 125 questions). The vast majority of 
Chief Justice Roberts’s questions fell into the Legal Argument category (17 of 22 total), 
probing the basis of each party’s position about the Court’s decision to accept the case. 
For instance, he inquired of the respondent, “I’m sorry. Again, I get to the question, why 
do you care? Why do you care whether we vacate [the] order or not? Your position is 
your client has no continuing interest in the case.”83 This was consistent with the overall 
Sample data, which showed that more than half of the Chief Justice’s questions were 
about Legal Arguments.84 
Also, consistent with the overall findings, 85  Chief Justice Roberts’s Policy 
questions focused on the effects of the outcome in Camreta and hypothetical future cases 
(4 of his 22 total questions during the argument). Chief Justice Roberts asked the 
petitioner (Camreta) several Policy A questions. For example, the Chief Justice asked: 
[Y]ou think it would be a different rule if we’re talking about some other 
criminal activity? The father’s selling drugs, and you think the child might 
have some evidence or at least be willing to talk about that. Do you need 
anything other than reasonableness in that case?86 
It is possible that the Chief Justice considered it his responsibility to guide the direction 
of oral argument, and for that reason he focused primarily on Legal Argument questions. 
Although the Chief Justice is not generally overly concerned with exploring policy 
issues, he was even less so in this case. In Camreta, 22.7% of his questions were about 
Policy, whereas, overall, 35.9% of his questions fell into that category.87 
The data from the overall Sample show that Justice Scalia was the most active 
questioner (asking 19.6% of all questions in the Sample),88 but he was even more active 
than average here, asking 25% of the 125 questions in the case. In the aggregate, Justice 
Scalia was by far the most vocal about his opinions regarding the content of public 
policy, asking nearly 28% of the Policy D questions in the Sample. 89  This was 
exemplified in Camreta, where he commented to the respondent: 
                                                 
81 Id. at 11-12. 
82 Id. at 12-14. 
83 Camreta Oral Argument, supra note 34, at 29. 
84 See infra Appendix C, Table 5. 
85 See infra Appendix C, Table 6. 
86 Camreta Oral Argument, supra note 34, at 15. 
87 See supra Table 2. 
88 See supra Table 1.             
89 See infra Appendix C, Table 9. 
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I don’t understand. It seems like a very strange rule to me. You mean it’s 
okay for a child protection worker to just ask the child passing in the hall . 
. . or not passing in the hall . . . [c]ome into this room, I have a question 
for you: Has your father been abusing you? And if the child says yes, 
thank you, and the child goes, then that’s okay?90 
Justice Scalia most often asked questions seeking clarification about the attorneys’ Legal 
Arguments.91 Many of Justice Scalia’s legal inquiries disclosed his opinions of those 
arguments, in a fashion similar to his Policy D questions. In Camreta he told the 
respondent’s lawyer: 
It will be something that could be replicated again in the future for some 
other reason. [It] isn’t true that it will just eliminate the whole purpose of 
our . . . jurisprudence in this area. In many cases [the] decision below can 
be appealed, [and] we will rule [on the] constitutional question.92 
Justice Scalia did not hold back at oral argument, which made it seem as though he 
viewed the argument as an opportunity to make his colleagues and the attorneys aware of 
his thinking. He made it clear when he agreed or disagreed with an attorney, and was 
candid about his opinions on the policy implications of the Court’s decisions.  
 Consistent with the overall data,93 Justice Kennedy did not ask a Threshold or 
Precedent question in Camreta. Instead, he asked questions that required the lawyers to 
define or even concede weaknesses of their positions on the legal issues. The following 
question was typical: “[W]e’re getting to the merits. Do you agree that . . . the seizure 
under the Fourth Amendment is the relevant category here?”94  
Justice Kennedy asked the third highest percentage of Policy questions,95 focusing 
especially on the implications of the Court’s decision (Policy A) or expressing his own 
views (Policy D).96 His questions in Camreta, three out of fourteen of which concerned 
Policy, illustrated this approach. Justice Kennedy explored the implications of a Supreme 
Court decision to vacate the ruling below asking, “Well, but Justice Alito’s question97 
was addressed to the Ninth Circuit. In the Ninth Circuit, it’s not going to come up again if 
we assume that our public employees are going to be law-abiding. They’re bound by this 
in the Ninth Circuit.”98 He also expressed his concern that a Supreme Court decision that 
vacated the Ninth Circuit ruling below would cause problems for law enforcement 
officers, stating: 
It seems to me that it would affect Camreta’s behavior and that of other 
child protective officers. The lawyer would explain: Now, legally this is 
                                                 
90 Camreta Oral Argument, supra note 34, at 34. 
91 See infra Appendix C, Table 5. 
92 Camreta Oral Argument, supra note 34, at 48. 
93 See infra Appendix C, Table 1 (Threshold) & Table 2 (Precedent). 
94 Camreta Oral Argument, supra note 34, at 16. 
95 See supra Table 2. 
96 See supra Part IV.C.3. 
97 Justice Alito’s question was addressed to the Respondent’s attorney, asking why the Ninth Circuit’s 
decision should not be reviewed on the merits. See Camreta Oral Argument, supra note 34, at 29-30. 
98 Id. at 31. 
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not binding; it just never happened. But three judges of the court of 
appeals in a reasoned decision have explained why this is contrary to the 
Constitution, and it would seem to me that any conscientious law 
enforcement officer [would] take that seriously into account.99 
The data suggest that Justice Kennedy regards oral argument as a dynamic process. 
He was actively engaged with the lawyers in defining the foundation and limits of their 
arguments. He was very willing to consider policy arguments, and willing to express his 
own views about policy. 
Justice Ginsburg asked the highest percentages of Threshold, Precedent, and Fact 
questions (just as she did in the overall Sample),100 and in this case 33% of her fifteen 
questions fell into one of these three categories. In Camreta, her first question was a 
Threshold question about mootness: “Why would he face liability?” 101  Her second 
question explored this issue further, examining whether the merits would be best 
addressed in a case of this procedural posture: “Because in this case, we have a plaintiff 
who is not going to be confronted with this situation again and who has put herself out of 
the running for damages because she didn’t . . . challenge the qualified immunity 
ruling.”102 
Justice Ginsburg did not ask any Precedent questions in Camreta, but she did 
clarify facts, inquiring: 
[W]hat has Oregon done in response to this Ninth Circuit decision? Before 
it said that the caseworkers could have this kind of interview with [the] 
child where there was a suspicion of abuse. Was there any change in 
practice in Oregon in response to the Ninth Circuit’s decision?103 
She also intervened near the end of the Deputy Solicitor General’s argument on behalf of 
the petitioner to ask that she address the legal issues: “You have very limited time. Could 
you . . . go to the merits of the Fourth Amendment question and give us the 
Government’s position on that?”104 Justice Ginsburg asked very few Policy questions, but 
when she did so, the question was a Policy A inquiry, posing a hypothetical about the 
limits of the decision: “Suppose we take the sheriff, the deputy sheriff, out. The only one 
who comes to the school and asks to talk to this child is the caseworker from the 
department of health?”105 
As noted above, Justice Ginsburg approached oral argument in a very “lawyerly” 
fashion. 106  She asked four Threshold questions, to ensure that the underlying legal 
requirements were met, and then gathered facts that may not have been included in the 
briefs. She was not likely to directly challenge the arguing attorneys about their legal 
arguments, but, rather, asked them to clarify their points. For example, she asked the 
                                                 
99 Id. at 23-24. 
100 See infra Appendix C, Table 1 (Threshold), Table 2 (Precedent) & Table 3 (Facts). 
101 Camreta Oral Argument, supra note 34, at 6. 
102 Id. at 8. 
103 Id. at 14. 
104 Id. at 24. 
105 Id. at 39. 
106 See supra Part IV.C.4. 
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respondent, “Where are you reading in the holding of the court of appeals? Because I was 
under the impression that they did say there’s only three ways: One is you get a warrant; 
another is you get parental consent; and a third is exigent circumstances. I thought that 
was [the] ruling of law by the Ninth Circuit.”107 She did not explore policy concerns in 
any detail and did not express her opinions or views about policy. 
Justice Breyer was the fourth most-active questioner at oral argument in the 
Study.108 He was atypically quiet in Camreta, asking only thirteen questions in total, not 
asking the petitioner any questions, and speaking for the first time on page 41 of the 
58-page transcript.109 Justice Breyer asked the second highest number of Policy questions 
in the overall Sample, 110 and when doing so he focused first on Policy A questions 
regarding the impact of the case’s outcome.111 In Camreta, eight of his thirteen questions 
fell into this category, such as, “Suppose that we dismiss the case as improvidently 
granted, while indicating in an opinion some of the questions that we find difficult such, 
for example, as the seizure question, et cetera; what kind of impact would that have in 
your opinion?”112 
Justice Breyer’s questions frequently revealed frustration about the lack of lucidity 
in the parties’ positions, in that he often asked a series of questions pushing for clarity. In 
Camreta, for example, he probed, “Same circumstance. Was there a seizure? No—no 
professor—no policeman? . . . School nurse? . . . Seizure? . . . And so, it’s not a seizure if 
exactly the same thing happens but there is no outside person there, but it is a seizure if 
there’s an outside person?” 113  Justice Breyer’s questions often probed the policy 
implications of a decision. That was true in Camreta, when he asked the attorney for the 
respondent, “Yes, if—while indicating the reasons being in part that there are difficult 
questions here, suggesting what they are. What . . . impact would that have?”114 
The data in this Study showed that Justice Alito asked the fewest questions after 
Justice Thomas,115 and in Camreta he asked only ten of the Court’s 125. While the bulk 
of Justice Alito’s questions usually concerned Legal Arguments,116 in this case six out of 
ten questions he asked related to Policy. Justice Alito generally asked Policy A questions, 
exploring the implications of the case at hand,117 and here four of his ten questions fell 
into that category. He asked four Legal Argument questions, including the following: 
“Well, could you have cross-petitioned in an effort to get damages, so if you had wanted 
to preserve the issue, you surely could have done that, couldn’t you?”118 Justice Alito’s 
Policy A questions explored the limiting principle of the case, such as, “Well, on the 
issue of consent, do you read the Ninth Circuit’s opinion as having an age limit? Suppose 
                                                 
107 Camreta Oral Argument, supra note 34, at 32. 
108 See supra Table 1. 
109 See Camreta Oral Argument, supra note 34, at 41. 
110 See supra Table 2. 
111 See supra Part IV.C.5. 
112 Camreta Oral Argument, supra note 34, at 50-51. 
113 Id. at 41. 
114 Id. at 51. 
115 See supra Table 1. 
116 See supra Part IV.C.6. 
117 See id. 
118 Camreta Oral Argument, supra note 34, at 48. 
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that the child is, let’s say, 16 years old. Is the child at 16 incapable of consenting to 
questioning?”119  
Justice Alito also asked a Policy B question about the legal principle that the Court 
should adopt: 
If you were designing what you would regard as an ideal system, and 
you’re very knowledgeable in this . . . area, and you concluded that some 
kind of approval by a detached individual should be required before 
something like this is allowed, would you set the standard at probable 
cause?120 
Justice Alito was not a very active questioner during oral arguments in the Sample,121 but 
he seemed to use the argument in Camreta as an opportunity to think through the legal 
issues as well as to consider hypothetical situations. In general, he did not usually express 
his own views about a case, which makes it difficult for arguing attorneys to anticipate or 
address his concerns about their arguments. 
Justice Sotomayor emerged as an active questioner during oral argument, and was 
especially talkative in Camreta, asking sixteen questions instead of her average 11.1 
questions per case (12.8% of the total questions asked in this case).122 She rarely asked 
Fact or Precedent questions,123 and did not do so here. The vast majority of her questions 
concerned Legal Arguments, and she was quite willing to challenge the advocates on 
their positions.124 She did so in Camreta, asking, “Doesn’t that go to the question of the 
reasonableness of the scope of the seizure? Don’t we have . . . other jurisprudence that 
basically addresses this question and says is this type of seizure or stop detention 
reasonable?”125  
Justice Sotomayor’s other questions in Camreta deviated from her norm as 
measured by the rest of the Sample, however. Ten of the sixteen questions she asked 
concerned Policy (62.5% of her questions in the case). She asked several Policy A 
questions, primarily focusing on the implications of the decision for law enforcement, 
such as, “law enforcement is never going to know where the line of reasonableness or 
unreasonableness is, is that correct?”126 She then asked, “They can’t speak to the child 
endlessly, can they?”127  
Justice Sotomayor’s concern for developing clear legal standards that can assist law 
enforcement officers could be a function of her past experience as a prosecutor,128 and 
may not extend to other policy issues (in schools or otherwise). However, in Camreta she 
                                                 
119 Id. at 36. 
120 Id. at 52. 
121 See supra Table 1. 
122 This is in contrast to Justice Sotomayor’s average of 6.3% of questions asked in the 29 cases in which 
she participated that were included in this Study. See id. 
123 See supra Part IV.C.7. 
124 See id. 
125 Camreta Oral Argument, supra note 34, at 44. 
126 Id. at 56. 
127 Id. at 57. 
128 Justice Sotomayor served as an assistant district attorney in New York from 1979-1984. See Biographies 
of Current Justices of the Supreme Court, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/biographies.aspx (last visited Sept. 23, 2012). 
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was certainly interested in drawing a practical line. Her active involvement during oral 
argument also gives advocates insights into her views, and the opportunity to address her 
concerns directly. Brief writers and oral advocates can use those insights to anticipate 
Justice Sotomayor’s questions or sticking points in petitions for writs of certiorari, 
written briefs, and in preparation for oral argument. 
Justice Kagan participated in just thirteen of the fifty-three cases in this Sample, so 
it will be interesting to assess whether her questioning style evolves as she gains bench 
experience over the coming terms. Because Justice Kagan served as Solicitor General of 
the United States,129 her familiarity with and experience in oral argument prior to joining 
the Court may affect how she questions advocates and how active a questioner she 
becomes. 
The data gathered on Justice Kagan in this Study show that she was most likely to 
ask questions to clarify Legal Arguments, but also dedicated about a quarter of her 
questions to inquiries about the implications of the Court’s decision (Policy A).130 She 
asked only four questions in Camreta, but three questions concerned Legal Arguments, 
and one concerned Policy A. The Policy A question that she asked was: 
But, General, I take it that that problem disappears—tell me if I’m 
wrong—if we find there’s no jurisdiction. If we Munsingwear this case, 
the decision is wiped off the case, you return to status quo ante, and you 
tell all your people that they can do what they would have done 
beforehand; is that right?131 
 Justice Kagan’s limited participation in Camreta as well as in the entire 
Sample examined in this Study warrants tentative conclusions about her overall 
approach to oral argument.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
 These findings show that the types of questions the Justices ask vary, and that 
they differ in the extent to which they examine policy issues. Some members of the 
Court, such as Justice Ginsburg, tend to probe the legal arguments, make certain to 
address threshold issues and clarify facts, but are not policy-oriented. Others, such as 
Justice Breyer, focus on the broad policy implications of a decision. Still others, such as 
Justice Scalia, use the argument as a time to challenge the oral advocates, allowing the 
lawyers to respond directly to the Justice’s own policy concerns. 
Our data suggest that oral argument does serve an important purpose. With the 
exception of Justice Thomas, all of the Justices took advantage of this opportunity to 
actively question the arguing attorneys about a variety of aspects of the case. Such 
exchanges between the attorneys and the Justices include consideration of the most 
relevant precedents, a clarification of facts, an in-depth examination of legal arguments 
and, most importantly, the opportunity for the Justices to explore the policy implications 
                                                 
129 Justice Kagan was confirmed as the 45th Solicitor General of the United States on March 19, 2009. See 
id. 
130 See supra Part IV.C.8. 
131 Camreta Oral Argument, supra note 34, at 56. 
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of their decisions. Oral argument also gives each Justice the chance to focus on the 
element or elements of the case that troubles him or her the most, and gives the arguing 
attorney the opportunity to address that Justice's concerns and perhaps win that vote. One 
negative aspect of this process seems to be the time constraint of only thirty minutes of 
argument per side. Given this very limited time period, not every Justice has the 
opportunity to ask many questions, and Justices often interrupt one another, making it 
extremely difficult for the arguing attorney to give thoughtful or expansive responses to 
questions. 
The extent to which the Justices are policy-oriented may differ depending on the 
type of case before the Court. We found, for example, that the Justices asked more policy 
questions in education cases than in non-education constitutional cases. In one recent 
education case, Camreta v. Greene, 42.4% of the Justices’ questions concerned policy 
(compared to the average of 34.8% of questions in the Sample as a whole). Each of the 
eight active questioners asked questions about policy, and two Justices were especially 
focused on this area: all of Justice Breyer’s questions in Camreta asked about policy, and, 
though not in line with her questioning style in the rest of the Sample, Justice Sotomayor 
concentrated the majority of her questions on policy. It would be beneficial to repeat this 
Study with a larger sample of education cases as well as a sample of other types of cases 
for purposes of comparison. For example, it may well be that the Court is more 
concerned with policy in areas such as health care, where its decision in National 
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius will have significant and immediate 
effects on the lives of the majority of citizens, or in other areas of heightened political 
salience such as free speech. While each of the Court’s decisions affects the primary 
conduct of the litigants outside the bounds of the case, education and health care 
(especially in terms of the scope of Congress’s commerce and taxing powers) are 
examples of policy matters that necessarily impact nearly all Americans.  
Oral argument plays a significant and unique role in the Supreme Court’s decision-
making process, giving Justices the opportunity to ask questions about issues that are of 
particular concern to them and that may not have been fully developed in the parties’ 
briefs. Examining the questions that the Justices ask during this process provides insight 
into their thinking and their concern for the ramifications of their decisions. These 
findings show that the Justices use oral argument to gather information about the policy 
implications of their decisions by raising questions regarding the legal principles that the 
Court should adopt, the courses of action the Court should take, or that reveal a Justice’s 
beliefs about the content of public policy. The data also show that the Justices differ in 
the extent that they explore these policy issues during oral argument, and the extent to 
which they are willing to identify their own policy preferences. Critics of “judicial 
activism” might argue that the policy focus at oral arguments demonstrates that the 
Supreme Court is outside its constitutional power and inappropriately legislating from the 
bench. But “policy” as defined in this Study encompasses questions that reflect the 
Justices’ awareness of the fact that the Court does not make decisions in a vacuum, and is 
carefully considering the impact of its decisions. 
This Study does, of course, have limitations. First, the Sample of cases was not 
randomly selected, thus limiting the ability to generalize the findings. Second, the cases 
selected for study (those raising constitutional issues and those concerning education) 
may be types of cases that are more likely to inspire a policy focus, given that they raise 
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issues that are often of elevated societal interest and concern. In addition, Justices 
Sotomayor and Kagan participated in far fewer oral arguments in the Sample than the 
other seven Justices currently on the Court, so their results may be less reliable in a 
broader context. 
Future research should be conducted to include a larger sample of cases, ideally all 
cases decided across a number of terms. In addition, it would be interesting to examine 
each Justice's questioning style over time. For example, do any of the Justices become 
more policy-oriented as they gain experience and confidence in their role on the Court? It 
would also be helpful to study the behavior of lower court judges, both state and federal, 
to see if their questioning styles display a similar focus on policy concerns. 
With these limitations in mind, this Study still has practical implications. Attorneys 
who argue before the Court can use these results to better prepare for their arguments by 
being able to anticipate which aspects of the case will likely be of most significance to 
each Justice. Attorneys who argue before the Court on a regular basis are certainly aware 
of the Justices' patterns of questioning, and may even have gathered their own data to 
better prepare for argument, but this Study gives attorneys making their first or only 
argument insight into what to expect, and more seasoned arguers a broader perspective. 
First-time arguing attorneys might well be surprised to know that much of their time in 
argument will be devoted to examining the policy implications of the case, and, given 
that fact, they should spend a considerable amount of time trying to formulate 
hypothetical questions about the extension or application of the decision as well as 
questions about the legal principles the Court should adopt, and the course of action the 
Court should take in deciding the case. In preparing such hypothetical questions, 
practitioners will want to consult the people who may be most affected by such a 
decision; in the field of education, for example, they would want to prepare with people 
such as school administrators. Finally, these data make clear that the Justices care about 
the policy implications of their decisions, and that they use oral argument as a time to 
explore those concerns. 
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Appendix A: Oral Arguments Sample 
 
October Term 2010 Cases Examined in this Study: 
Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011) (argued Nov. 3, 2010) 
Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011) (argued 
Mar. 28, 2011) 
Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011) (argued Feb. 22, 2011) 
Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011) (argued Nov. 2, 2010) 
Camreta v. Greene, 131 S. Ct 2020 (2011) (argued Mar. 1, 2011) 
Connick v. Thompson, 131 S. Ct. 1350 (2011) (argued Oct. 6, 2010) 
Davis v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011) (argued Mar. 21, 2011) 
Borough of Duryea, Pa. v. Guarnieri, 131 S. Ct. 2488 (2011) (argued Mar. 22, 2011) 
Kentucky v. King, 131 S. Ct. 1849 (2011) (argued Jan. 12, 2011) 
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 131 S. Ct. 2394 (2011) (argued Mar. 23, 2011) 
Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289 (2011) (argued Oct. 13, 2010) 
Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011) (argued Oct. 6, 2010) 
Walker v. Martin, 131 S. Ct. 1120 (2011) (argued Nov. 29, 2010) 
 
October Term 2009 Cases Examined in this Study: 
Berghuis v. Smith, 130 S. Ct. 1382 (2010) (argued Jan. 20, 2010) 
Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010) (argued Mar. 1, 2010) 
Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010) (argued Jan. 11, 2010) 
Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of Law v. Martinez, 130 S. 
Ct. 2971 (2010) (argued Apr. 19, 2010) 
Doe v. Reed, 130 S. Ct. 2811 (2010) (argued Apr. 28, 2010) 
Florida v. Powell, 130 S. Ct. 1195 (2010) (argued Dec. 7, 2009) 
Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010) (argued Nov. 9, 2009) 
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010) (argued Mar. 2, 2010) 
City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2010) (argued Apr. 19, 2010) 
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (argued Oct. 13, 2009) 
Smith v. Spisak, 130 S. Ct. 676 (2010) (argued Oct. 13, 2009) 
Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs and Trainmen Gen. Comm. of 
Adjustment, Cent. Region, 130 S. Ct. 584 (2009) (argued Oct. 7, 2009) 
United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010) (argued Jan. 12, 2010) 
United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010) (argued Oct. 6, 2009) 
 
October Term 2008 Cases Examined in this Study: 
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009) (argued Oct. 7, 2008) 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (argued Dec. 10, 2008) 
Bobby v. Bies, 556 U.S. 825 (2009) (argued Apr. 27, 2009) 
Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (argued March 3, 2009) 
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (argued March 24, 2009) 
Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. 449 (2009) (argued Dec. 9, 2008) 
Dist. Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009) 
(argued March 2, 2009) 
Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246 (2009), (argued Dec. 2, 2008) 
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Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 557 U.S. 230 (2009) (argued Apr. 28, 2009) 
Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. 729 (2009) (argued Dec. 3, 2008) 
Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57 (2008) (argued Oct. 15, 2008) 
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (argued Oct. 7, 2008) 
Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433 (2009) (argued April 20, 2009) 
Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586 (2009) (argued Jan. 21, 2009) 
Locke v. Karass, 555 U.S. 207 (2009) (argued Oct. 6, 2008) 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009) (argued Nov. 10, 2008)  
Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009), (argued Jan. 13, 2009) 
Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160 (2009) (argued Oct. 14, 2008) 
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (argued Oct. 14, 2008) 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009) (argued Nov. 12, 2008) 
Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1 (2009) (argued April 1, 2009) 
Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364 (2009) (argued Apr. 21, 2009) 
Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335 (2009) (argued Nov. 5, 2008) 
Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179 (2009) (argued Oct. 15, 2008) 
Yeager v. United States, 557 U.S. 110 (2009) (argued Mar. 23, 2009) 
Ysursa v. Pocatello Educ. Ass’n, 555 U.S. 353 (2009) (argued Nov. 3, 2008) 
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Appendix B: Coding Guidelines 
 
F: Facts 
- Questions about the facts of the case: What happened? When? 
- Page numbers: Where in the brief do you make that argument? 
- Does not include questions about the case’s legal history 
 
T: Threshold 
- Questions about threshold issues 
- Jurisdiction: Which court has the right to decide this issue? 
 
P: Precedent 
- Questions about whether a specified precedent applies 
- Are you asking us to revisit that? 
 
E: External Actors 
- Questions about how outside parties would like the Court to decide 
- Common examples of outside parties: Congress, state legislatures, police 
 
L: Legal Argument 
- Questions about petitioner’s/respondent’s argument 
- Legal posture/history of the case at hand 
- Underlying rationale of cases decided in the past 
- Questions that reveal the Justice’s opinion on law (not policy) 
 
Policy: 
- A: Hypothetical questions and applications/extensions of the case at hand 
o Questions about how this decision will be applied in the future 
o Hypothetical fact patterns that would fall under this ruling 
- B: Questions about legal principles that the Court should adopt 
o The “nitty-gritty” description of a proposed rule 
o Questions about the logistics of a potential test 
- C: Questions about courses of action the Court should take 
o Should the Court make a rule? 
o Questions about what specifically the Court should do (not just rule in favor 
of one party or another) 
- D: Questions that reveal a Justice’s opinion on policy 
o Must be very obvious that it’s an opinion 
o “It seems to me…” is a good clue 
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Appendix C: Content Variation 
 
Table 1: Threshold (10 questions, 0.2% of total questions) 
 
Justice 
% of Threshold Questions 
Asked (% of Individual 
Justice’s Total Questions) 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg 40.0% (0.6%) 
Antonin Scalia 30.0% (0.3%) 
John G. Roberts 10.0% (0.1%) 
Sonia Sotomayor 10.0% (0.3%) 
Elena Kagan 10.0% (0.9%) 
John Paul Stevens 0.0% (0.0%) 
Anthony Kennedy 0.0% (0.0%) 
David Souter 0.0% (0.0%) 
Clarence Thomas 0.0% (0.0%) 
Stephen Breyer 0.0% (0.0%) 
Samuel Alito 0.0% (0.0%) 
 
Table 2: Precedent (31 questions, 0.6% of total questions) 
 
Justice 
% of Precedent Questions 
Asked (% of Individual 
Justice’s Total Questions) 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg 29.0% (1.4%) 
John G. Roberts 25.8% (1.0%) 
Anthony Kennedy 16.1% (1.0%) 
Stephen Breyer 9.7% (0.5%) 
John Paul Stevens 6.5% (0.6%) 
David Souter 6.5% (0.6%) 
Samuel Alito 3.2% (0.2%) 
Sonia Sotomayor 3.2% (0.3%) 
Antonin Scalia 0.0% (0.0%) 
Clarence Thomas 0.0% (0.0%) 
Elena Kagan 0.0% (0.0%) 
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Table 3: Facts (369 questions, 7.2% of total questions) 
 
Justice 
% of Fact Questions Asked 
(% of Individual Justice’s 
Total Questions) 
Ruther Bader Ginsburg 28.7% (16.7%) 
Antonin Scalia 23.0% (8.5%) 
John G. Roberts 15.2% (7.0%) 
Stephen Breyer 10.6% (6.2%) 
Anthony Kennedy 6.8% (4.8%) 
John Paul Stevens 5.7% (6.1%) 
Samuel Alito 4.1% (3.7%) 
David Souter 3.5% (3.8%) 
Sonia Sotomayor 2.2% (2.5%) 
Elena Kagan 0.3% (0.9%) 
Clarence Thomas 0.0% (0.0%) 
 
Table 4: External Actors’ Preferences (25 questions, 0.5% of total questions) 
 
Justice 
% of External Actors’ 
Preferences Questions Asked 
(% of Individual Justice’s 
Total Questions) 
Antonin Scalia 16.0% (0.4%) 
Anthony Kennedy 16.0% (0.8%) 
David Souter 16.0% (1.2%) 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg 16.0% (0.6%) 
John G. Roberts 16.0% (0.5%) 
John Paul Stevens 8.0% (0.6%) 
Stephen Breyer 8.0% (0.3%) 
Sonia Sotomayor 4.0% (0.3%) 
Clarence Thomas 0.0% (0.0%) 
Samuel Alito 0.0% (0.0%) 
Elena Kagan 0.0% (0.0%) 
 
 
Table 5: Legal Argument (2873 questions, 56.2% of total questions) 
 
Justice 
% of Legal Argument 
Questions Asked (% of 
Individual Justice’s Total 
Questions) 
Antonin Scalia 19.8% (56.6%) 
John G. Roberts 15.4% (55.5%) 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg 13.4% (60.7%) 
Stephen Breyer 10.9% (50.1%) 
Anthony Kennedy 9.4% (51.9%) 
Sonia Sotomayor 7.8% (69.6%) 
John Paul Stevens 7.4% (61.4%) 
Samuel Alito 7.1% (49.6%) 
David Souter 6.4% (53.5%) 
Elena Kagan 2.5% (61.7%) 
Clarence Thomas 0.0% (0.0%) 




Table 6: Policy A (923 questions, 18.0% of total questions) 
 
Justice 
% of Policy A Questions 
Asked (% of Individual 
Justice’s Total Questions) 
John G. Roberts 17.4% (20.2%) 
Antonin Scalia 16.0% (14.8%) 
Stephen Breyer 15.2% (22.3%) 
Samuel Alito 14.8% (33.5%) 
Anthony Kennedy 10.5% (18.7%) 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg 8.0% (11.7%) 
John Paul Stevens 6.1% (16.2%) 
Sonia Sotomayor 5.1% (14.6%) 
David Souter 3.9% (10.5%) 
Elena Kagan 2.9% (23.5%) 
Clarence Thomas 0.0% (0.0%) 
 
Table 7: Policy B (248 questions, 4.8% of total questions) 
 
Justice 
% of Policy B Questions 
Asked (% of Individual 
Justice’s Total Questions) 
Stephen Breyer 15.7% (6.2%) 
John G. Roberts 13.7% (4.3%) 
David Souter 13.3% (9.6%) 
Antonin Scalia 12.5% (3.1%) 
Anthony Kennedy 12.5% (6.0%) 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg 8.1% (3.2%) 
Samuel Alito 8.1% (4.9%) 
Sonia Sotomayor 6.0% (4.7%) 
John Paul Stevens 5.6% (4.1%) 
Elena Kagan 4.4% (9.6%) 
Clarence Thomas 0.0% (0.0%) 
 
Table 8: Policy C (165 questions, 3.2% of total questions) 
 
Justice 
% of Policy C Questions 
Asked (% of Individual 
Justice’s Total Questions) 
Antonin Scalia 20.0% (3.3%) 
Stephen Breyer 17.6% (4.6%) 
John G. Roberts 15.0% (3.1%) 
Anthony Kennedy 12.1% (3.8%) 
David Souter 8.5% (4.1%) 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg 7.9% (2.1%) 
Sonia Sotomayor 7.3% (3.7%) 
Samuel Alito 6.1% (2.4%) 
John Paul Stevens 5.5% (2.6%) 
Clarence Thomas 0.0% (0.0%) 
Elena Kagan 0.0% (0.0%) 
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Table 9: Policy D (471 questions, 9.2% of total questions) 
 
Justice 
% of Policy D Questions 
Asked (% of Individual 
Justice’s Total Questions) 
Antonin Scalia 27.8% (13.1%) 
Anthony Kennedy 14.4% (13.1%) 
John G. Roberts 14.0% (8.3%) 
Stephen Breyer 13.0% (9.7%) 
David Souter 12.1% (16.7%) 
John Paul Stevens 6.2% (8.4%) 
Samuel Alito 4.9% (5.6%) 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg 4.0% (3.0%) 
Sonia Sotomayor 2.8% (4.0%) 
Elena Kagan 0.8% (3.5%) 
Clarence Thomas 0.0% (0.0%) 
 
 
